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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Fifty-five-year-old Mark Howard Pendleton was charged with felony possession
of a controlled substance – methamphetamine, unlawful possession of a firearm, and a
persistent violator sentencing enhancement. Mr. Pendleton filed a motion to suppress,
which the district court denied after determining Mr. Pendleton did not have standing to
challenge the search of the building where the methamphetamine and firearm at issue
had been found. Following a jury trial, the jury found Mr. Pendleton guilty of possession
of a controlled substance – methamphetamine.

Pursuant to a plea agreement,

Mr. Pendleton then agreed to plead guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm and admit
to the persistent violator sentencing enhancement.
On appeal, Mr. Pendleton asserts the district court erred when it determined he
did not have standing to challenge the search of the building.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging Mr. Pendleton committed one count
of felony drug-trafficking in cocaine or a mixture of (28 grams or more but less than 200
grams), one count of felony possession of a controlled substance, and one count of
felony unlawful possession of a firearm. (R., pp.25-26.)1
At Mr. Pendleton’s preliminary hearing, Detective Paul Egbert with the Idaho
State Police testified that he and other officers assisted two Idaho Department of
Correction parole officers with the search of the upstairs of the building located at 187

All citations to the Clerk’s Record on Appeal refer to the pagination from the 352-page
PDF electronic version of the record.
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First Street in Idaho Falls. (See Tr., Aug. 13, 2014, p.3, L.25 – p.4, L.5, p.5, L.11 – p.8,
L.24; R., p.27.) Detective Egbert testified the parole officers had called for assistance
with a “home search” at the residence of Mr. Pendleton. (Tr., Aug. 13, 2014, p.5, Ls.1116, p.6, L.2 – p.8, L.20.) Mr. Pendleton had been on felony parole in Bonneville County
No. CR 2009-1613. (See Tr., Aug. 13, 2014, p.9, L.4 – p.11, L.14, p.42, Ls.6-16.)
The building had been used for commercial purposes off and on, and the
downstairs was under renovation at the time of the search. (Tr., Aug. 13, 2014, p.13,
Ls.1-3.) Detective Egbert described the upstairs of the building as an apartment with
two rooms used as bedrooms. (Tr., Aug. 13, 2014, p.13, Ls.3-18.) Mr. Pendleton, an
adult female, and two minor females were upstairs. (Tr., Aug. 13, 2014, p.7, Ls.19-21.)
Detective Egbert testified that when he arrived upstairs, the parole officers
directed him to a pellet rifle in the living room. (See Tr., Aug. 13, 2014, p.8, Ls.9-16,
p.12, Ls.11-15, p.15, Ls.2-6.)

He and the other officers began searching for

contraband. (Tr., Aug. 13, 2014, p.8, Ls.23-24.) Mr. Pendleton’s daughter, one of the
minor females present, stated one of the bedrooms was hers. (See Tr., Aug. 13, 2014,
p.13, Ls.22-24.)
bedroom.

The detective testified the other bedroom was Mr. Pendleton’s

(See Tr., Aug. 13, 2014, p.14, Ls.15-17.)

Detective Egbert asked

Mr. Pendleton for the key to the locked closet in that room. (Tr., Aug. 13, 2014, p.20,
L.25 – p.21, Ls.10.)

According to Detective Egbert, Mr. Pendleton made several

different statements regarding the closet and key, eventually stating the key was locked
inside the closet on a keychain with a small tape measure attached to it. (Tr., Aug. 13,
2014, p.21, Ls.11-19.) Detective Egbert had the closet door breached, and found inside
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the closet a key in a black lockbox on a keychain with a small tape measure attached.
(Tr., Aug. 13, 2014, p.21, L.20 – p.22, L.11.)
Detective Egbert testified there was men’s clothing in the dressers and closet in
the bedroom. (Tr., Aug. 13, 2014, p.14, Ls.2-3.) There was also a .22 caliber pistol in
the closet. (Tr., Aug. 13, 2014, p.15, Ls.7-20.) The detective further testified suspected
methamphetamine and suspected cocaine were in the closet. (Tr., Aug. 13, 2014, p.15,
L.24 – p.16, L.25, p.17, L.24 – p.18, L.23.)

The substances tested presumptively

positive, respectively, for methamphetamine and cocaine. (Tr., Aug. 13, 2014, p.17,
Ls.5-10, p.18, L.24 – p.19, L.3.) Additionally, Mr. Pendleton’s prescription pill bottles
were in the closet. (Tr., Aug. 13, 2014, p.17, Ls.11-15, see Tr., Aug. 13, 2014, p.31,
Ls.3-6.)
On cross-examination, Detective Egbert testified that one of the parole officers
had told him the bedroom was Mr. Pendleton’s. (Tr., Aug. 13, 2014, p.36, Ls.11-17.)
Work coveralls were hanging in the closet, and Mr. Pendleton had told the detective he
was working for the owner of the building doing construction work downstairs.
(Tr., Aug. 13, 2014, p.37, Ls.10-19.) The storage area was full of “construction type
stuff.” (Tr., Aug. 13, 2014, p.37, Ls.21-22.)
In its argument, the State emphasized the bedroom with the closet appeared to
be a male’s room. (Tr., Aug. 13, 2014, p.48, Ls.15-23.) The State then argued “there is
a certain control and possessory ownership over these things that were [found] inside of
that closet. So we’re going to ask the Court to bind the defendant over based on that.”
(Tr., Aug. 13, 2014, p.49, Ls.19-23.)

Based on Detective Egbert’s testimony, the
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magistrate found probable cause and bound Mr. Pendleton over to the district court on
each count. (Tr., Aug. 13, 2014, p.50, L.6 – p.51, Ls.11-15.)
The State then charged Mr. Pendleton by Prosecuting Attorney’s Information with
drug-trafficking in cocaine (28 grams or more but less than 200 grams), possession of a
controlled substance – methamphetamine, and unlawful possession of a firearm.
(R., pp.36-37.) The State later moved to dismiss the drug-trafficking in cocaine count
because the lab results indicated the substance at issue for that count was lidocaine,
not cocaine. (See R., pp.70-71, 86-87; Tr., Jan. 26, 2015, p.17, Ls.6-9.) The State
amended the information to move forward with the possession of a controlled substance
– methamphetamine and unlawful possession of a firearm counts. (See R., pp.83-85.)
Mr. Pendleton filed a Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence, under the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (R., pp.39-41.) The motion to
suppress asserted the officers had no warrant or legal cause to search Mr. Pendleton,
because the officers had no articulable facts to support probable cause for a search
warrant and an exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to the circumstances.
(R., pp.39-40.) After the district court allowed Mr. Pendleton’s counsel to withdraw
(R., p.58), Mr. Pendleton filed, pro se, additional motions to suppress containing
substantively the same arguments. (R., pp.72-74, 94-96.)2
At the motion to suppress hearing, the State argued it would “not agree that
[Mr. Pendleton] has standing to go forward until he establishes where he was residing
and that, in fact, he was residing at that residence. . . . If he won’t do that, then he has

Mr. Pendleton had entered guilty pleas to the two charges under a binding plea
agreement (R., pp.89-90), but the district court later granted his motion to withdraw the
guilty pleas. (R., pp.92-93, 195-96.)

2
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no standing.”

(Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.46, Ls.7-15.)

On the “standing” issue,

Mr. Pendleton testified he was employed by one Mr. Corona, the owner of the building
at 187 First Street, and admitted his check stubs from Mr. Corona’s business into
evidence. (Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.52, L.11 – p.53, L.12; see Def. Ex. A, Feb. 19, 2015.)
Mr. Pendleton did not reside at the building, but he worked there to clean the outside
and had his tools there. (Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.54, Ls.6-9.) He further testified, “I had
certain responsibility to secure the building. I had access to the tools which were there
at the building to perform my job.” (Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.54, Ls.18-20.)
On cross-examination, Mr. Pendleton testified he had never lived permanently at
the building, and had not resided or slept at the building for three months. (Tr., Feb. 19,
2015, p.55, Ls.7-16, p.56, Ls.12-21.) Mr. Pendleton had been living at his cousin’s
residence at a different address. (Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.55, L.16 – p.56, L.5.)
The State contended Mr. Pendleton “has definitively shown this Court he does
not reside at that location.

And if he doesn’t reside at that location, he has no

reasonable expectation of privacy at that location.” (Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.58, Ls.5-8.)
The State further argued Mr. Pendleton indicated he was not an overnight guest, and he
could not “claim a privacy interest in a location in which he is not residing or an
overnight guest.” (Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.58, Ls.9-13.) The State argued Mr. Pendleton
“can’t go forward with a motion to suppress if he has no privacy interest.” (Tr., Feb. 19,
2015, p.58, Ls.18-19.)
In response, Mr. Pendleton asserted there is an “expectance of privacy when you
work for a certain individual depending on the type of job that you do.” (Tr., Feb. 19,
2015, p.59, Ls.3-5.) He asserted he was the foreman when his boss was not present,
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and therefore was in control of his work area and had to uphold the wishes of the owner
to allow “no trespassing by anybody.”

(Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.59, Ls.6-10.)

Mr. Pendleton and his boss expected privacy so that Mr. Pendleton would not be
harassed and could perform his job without being interrupted. (Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.59,
Ls.11-16.) Mr. Pendleton asserted, “I do expect a large amount of privacy based on
that.” (Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.59, Ls.17-18.)
In rebuttal, the State argued, “I’m not aware of any case law that says that you
have an expectation of privacy at the workplace.” (Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.59, Ls.21-23.)
The State contended that if Mr. Pendleton “is not going to admit that he resides at that—
resided at that location, he has no standing to bring this motion to suppress.”
(Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.60, Ls.4-6.)
The district court, based on Mr. Pendleton’s testimony, found that Mr. Pendleton
was employed by Mr. Corona at 187 First Street. (Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.60, Ls.11-18.)
The district court heard testimony that Mr. Pendleton had a job and certain
responsibilities associated with that job. (Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.60, Ls.23-25.) The
district court accepted the checks written to Mr. Pendleton (Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.60,
Ls.19-22), and also accepted his testimony that,
he does not reside at this residence; that he did work at this location; that
he has some responsibilities, which—clean out the building, has
responsibility to secure the building; that he never permanently resided
there; that he hadn’t lived there for three months; but that at the time that
is in question, he was sleeping at a separate residence . . . at a cousin’s
residence; and he definitely states that he has not resided and does not
reside at this residence of Mr. Corona.
(Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.60, L.11 – p.61, L.10.)
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Addressing Mr. Pendleton, the district court determined it could not “make a
finding that [the items found at the building] should be suppressed without some initial
standing. And if you’re claiming today that this is not your place of residence, then the
Court simply, as [the State] correctly pointed out, cannot proceed any further.”
(Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.61, Ls.14-18.) The district court also told Mr. Pendleton, “what
you are asking this Court to do, which I am unable to do based upon the testimony I’ve
heard today, is to make a specific finding based upon constitutional protections that
these matters should be suppressed under the authority.”

(Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.62,

Ls.1-5.)
As to whether an employee has some expectation of privacy at a workplace, the
district court stated:
I’m confident that there is some authority that relates to that. I have
in my own mind my own understanding as to how far that authority will go,
but I can say very clearly today that, based upon the testimony that the
Court has heard today, the Court can make no finding that there was any
expectation of privacy established by you based upon your
assertions today.
(Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.62, Ls.6-15.)

Thus, the district court denied the motion to

suppress. (Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.62, Ls.16-17.)
After the denial of the motion to suppress, the State amended the information a
second time to include a Part II charging Mr. Pendleton with a persistent violator
sentencing enhancement pursuant to I.C. § 19-2514. (R., pp.213-16.)
The case proceeded to a jury trial on the possession of a controlled substance –
methamphetamine count, where the parole officers, Detective Egbert, and other Idaho
State Police officers testified on behalf of the State. (R., pp.293-99.) The owner of the
building, Ruben Corona, was also called as a State’s witness under a subpoena. (Trial

7

Tr., Vol. I, p.172, Ls.16-21, p.174, Ls.10-16.)

Mr. Corona testified he had hired

Mr. Pendleton to do construction work at the building (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.174, Ls.17-19),
and later allowed Mr. Pendleton to move into the upstairs apartment. (Trial Tr., Vol. I,
p.175, L.19 – p.176, L.14.) Mr. Pendleton’s daughter testified for the defense that she
and Mr. Pendleton never lived at the building. (See Trial Tr., Vol. II, pp.97-99.)3
During the State’s closing argument, the State contended Mr. Pendleton was in
possession of the methamphetamine because he lived at the building: “If this was just a
job site, why were his old pill bottles there . . . . Why would anyone keep personal items
like that at just a job site?” (See Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.156 – p.160.) Later in rebuttal, the
State

argued

the

issue

was

whether

or

not

Mr.

Pendleton

“possessed

methamphetamine. And it was his house, that he said he lived in, and his bedroom,
and his daughter stayed there, too.” (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.171 – p.172.)
The jury found Mr. Pendleton guilty of possession of a controlled substance—
methamphetamine.

(R., pp.300, 303.)

Pursuant to a binding plea agreement,

Mr. Pendleton then agreed to plead guilty to the unlawful possession of a firearm charge
and admit to the persistent violator sentencing enhancement. (See R., pp.300-01.)
For possession of a controlled substance – methamphetamine, the district court
imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with three years fixed. (R., pp.327-28.) For
unlawful possession of a firearm, the district court imposed a unified sentence of five
years, with three years fixed.

(R., p.328.)

The sentences were to be served

concurrently. (R., p.328.)

3

About half of Volume II of the Trial Transcript does not contain line numbers.
8

Mr. Pendleton filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Judgment of
Conviction. (R., pp.332-336.)

9

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it determined Mr. Pendleton did not have standing to
challenge the search of the building?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Determined Mr. Pendleton Did Not Have Standing To
Challenge The Search Of The Building
A.

Introduction
Mr. Pendleton asserts the district court erred when it determined he did not have

standing to challenge the search of the building.

The district court determined

Mr. Pendleton could not have standing unless he claimed the building was his place of
residence. (See Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.61, Ls.14-18.) Contrary to the district court’s
determination, one may have standing to challenge the search of one’s workplace.
Here, Mr. Pendleton had standing to challenge the search because he had a subjective
expectation of privacy in the place searched that society is willing to recognize
as reasonable.
B.

Standard Of Review And Applicable Law
The standard of review for a motion to suppress is bifurcated. An appellate court

defers to the trial court’s findings of fact unless the findings are clearly erroneous, and
freely reviews the trial court’s application of constitutional principles to the facts as
found. State v. Hankey, 134 Idaho 844, 846 (2000).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that “[s]tanding is an issue over which this
court exercises free review.” State v. Doe, 148 Idaho 919, 936 (2010). “The issue of
whether a party has standing to assert a particular claim should be resolved before the
merits of the claim are reached.” Id.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. “This guarantee has been incorporated
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through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the states.”
State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810 (2009). “Evidence obtained in violation of the
amendment generally may not be used as evidence against the victim of the illegal
government action.” Id. at 810-11. “This rule, known as the exclusionary rule, applies
to evidence obtained directly from the illegal government action and to evidence
discovered through the exploitation of the original illegality, or the fruit of the poisonous
tree.” Id. at 811.
“Any warrantless search or seizure of a citizen is presumptively unreasonable
unless if falls within certain specific and well-delineated exceptions.” Halen v. State,
136 Idaho 829, 833 (2002). “When a warrantless search or seizure is challenged by the
defendant, the State bears the burden to show that a recognized exception to the
warrant requirement is applicable.” Id.
However, “[a] person challenging a search has the burden of showing that he or
she had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the item or place searched.” State v.
Pruss, 145 Idaho 623, 626 (2008) (citing Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104
(1980); State v. Cowen, 104 Idaho 649, 651 (1983)). “That involves a two-part inquiry:
(1) Did the person have a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the
challenged search? and (2) Is society willing to recognize that expectation as
reasonable?” Id. (citing California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986); State v. Donato,
135 Idaho 469, 473 (2001)). As shorthand for this inquiry, courts often refer to whether
a defendant has “standing” to challenge a search. See, e.g., State v. Haworth, 106
Idaho 405, 407 n.2 (1984).
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C.

Mr. Pendleton Had Standing To Challenge The Search Because He Had A
Subjective Expectation Of Privacy In The Place Searched That Society Is Willing
To Recognize As Reasonable
Mr. Pendleton asserts he had standing to challenge the search of the building

because he had a subjective expectation of privacy in the place searched that society is
willing to recognize as reasonable. Contrary to the district court’s determination that
Mr. Pendleton could not have standing unless he claimed the building was his place of
residence (see Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.61, Ls.14-18), one may have standing to challenge
the search of one’s workplace. Mr. Pendleton had standing to challenge the search of
the building because he had a subjective expectation of privacy in his workplace that
society is willing to recognize as reasonable.
Under the first part of the inquiry into whether Mr. Pendleton had standing or a
legitimate expectation of privacy, see Pruss, 145 Idaho at 626, Mr. Pendleton had a
subjective expectation of privacy in the building. Mr. Pendleton worked at the building
for the owner of the building, had access to the tools there, and had responsibility to
secure the building. (See Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.54, Ls.6-20, p.61, Ls.1-5.) Thus, as he
asserted, Mr. Pendleton expected privacy at the building, his workplace.

(See

Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.59, Ls.2-18.)
The second part of the inquiry is an issue of law: “Is society willing to recognize
[Mr. Pendleton’s] expectation of privacy as being reasonable?” See Pruss, 145 Idaho at
626. This part of the inquiry examines “whether the government’s intrusion infringes
upon the personal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment.”
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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Id.

As the Idaho Supreme Court explained in Pruss, “[a] structure need not be one’s
‘home’ in order for the occupant to have a legitimate expectation of privacy there.” Id.
(quoting Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96 (1990)).

“The Fourth Amendment

protects people, not places, and provides sanctuary for citizens wherever they have a
legitimate expectation of privacy.” Id. (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).
One may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in one’s workplace. Indeed,
the United States Supreme Court has held that, “[w]ithin the workplace context, this
Court has recognized that employees may have a reasonable expectation of privacy
against intrusions by police.” O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 716 (1987) (citing
Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968)). “As with the expectation of privacy in one’s
home, such an expectation in one’s place of work is ‘based upon societal expectations
that have deep roots in the history of the Amendment.’” Id. (quoting Oliver v. United
States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 n.8 (1984)). The O’Connor Court defined the “workplace” as
including “those areas and items that are related to work and are generally within the
employer’s control.” Id. at 715. “These areas remain part of the workplace context
even if the employee has placed personal items in them, such as a photograph placed
in desk or a letter posted on an employee bulletin board.” Id. at 716.
In an earlier case, the United States Supreme Court held “[t]he Warrant Clause
of the Fourth Amendment protects commercial buildings as well as private homes. To
hold otherwise would belie the origin of that Amendment, and the American colonial
experience.” Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311 (1978). The Marshall Court
explained that the general warrant, which allowed colonial officers to search suspected
places without evidence of a fact committed, “was a recurring point of contention in the
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Colonies immediately preceding the Revolution.” Id. The Court further noted: “The
particular offensiveness it engendered was acutely felt by the merchants and
businessmen whose premises and products were inspected for compliance with the
several parliamentary revenue measures that most irritated the colonists.” Id. “‘[T]he
Fourth Amendment’s commands grew in large measure out of the colonists’ experience
with the writs of assistance . . . [that] granted sweeping power to customs officials and
other agents of the King to search at large for smuggled goods.’” Id. (quoting United
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 708 (1977)) (alterations in original).
In the Mancusi case cited by the O’Connor Court, the United States Supreme
Court held a union employee who shared an office with other union employees had a
privacy interest in the office sufficient to challenge the warrantless search of the office.
Mancusi, 392 U.S. at 369. The Court in Mancusi observed that “if DeForte [the union
employee] had occupied a ‘private’ office in the union headquarters, and union records
had been seized from a desk or a filing cabinet in that office, he would have had
standing.” Id. “In such a ‘private’ office, DeForte would have been entitled to expect
that he would not be disturbed except by personal or business invitees, and that records
would not be taken except with his permission or that of his union superiors.” Id. The
Mancusi Court then explained, “[i]t seems to us that the situation was not fundamentally
changed because DeForte shared an office with other union officers.” Id. “DeForte still
could reasonably have expected that only those persons and their personal or business
guests would enter the office, and that records would not be touched except with their
permission or that of union higher-ups.” Id.

15

Thus, contrary to the district court’s determination (see Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.61,
Ls.14-18), one may have standing to challenge a search of one’s workplace because
one may have a reasonable expectation of privacy therein.

Here, Mr. Pendleton’s

expectation of privacy in the building was one that society is willing to recognize as
reasonable. Much like the private office discussed in Mancusi, Mr. Pendleton could
reasonably have expected that he would not be disturbed in the building, as his
workplace, except by personal or business invitees. See Mancusi, 392 U.S. at 369.
Mr. Pendleton had responsibility to secure the building (see Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.54,
Ls.18-19), and there was no evidence presented that the building was open to the
public. Thus, a reasonably respectful citizen would not make an uninvited entry into the
building. Cf. Pruss, 145 Idaho at 628 (“Police officers acting without a warrant are
entitled to the same intrusion as a reasonably respectful citizen.

A reasonably

respectful citizen would not make an uninvited entry into another’s tent pitched on public
lands.” (citation omitted)). Based upon societal expectations that have deep roots in the
history of the Fourth Amendment, see O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 716, Mr. Pendleton had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the building as his workplace.
Because Mr. Pendleton had a subjective expectation of privacy in the place
searched that society is willing to recognize as reasonable, he had a legitimate
expectation of privacy or standing to challenge the search of the building. See Pruss,
145 Idaho at 626. The district court therefore erred when it determined Mr. Pendleton
did not have standing to challenge the search.
Because the district court erred, it did not reach the merits of Mr. Pendleton’s
motion to suppress and consider whether the State met its burden of showing an
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exception to the warrant requirement applied to the search of the building.
Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.46, L.1 – p.62, L.21.)

(See

Thus, Mr. Pendleton’s judgment of

conviction and the district court’s order denying his motion to suppress should be
vacated, and the case should be remanded to the district court. Cf. State v. Pachosa,
No. 42950, ___Idaho ___, ___ P.3d ___, 2016 WL 933158 (2016) (vacating an order
granting a motion to suppress and remanding the case to the district court for it to
consider if the arresting officer had reasonable suspicion under the totality of
the circumstances).
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Pendleton respectfully requests this Court vacate his
judgment of conviction, vacate the district court’s order denying his motion to suppress,
and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 11th day of May, 2016.

___________/s/______________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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